An efficient and practical authenticated key agreement protocol based on the line of geometry is proposed in this paper. It is a good solution to provide authentication and confidentiality. Identity authentication and message confidentiality are two important issues for the open network environment. In the proposed protocol, the authorized user can access multi-servers securely by keeping only a weak password and a smart card. Owing to the limited memory of the smart card, the secret information stored in the smart card has a size independent of the number of servers to which it connects. The proposed protocol provides mutual authentication between the user and the server and enables them to establish a common session key to provide message confidentiality for each other. It can also resist the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the off-line dictionary attack, the known key attack, the unknown key share attack, the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack. The security of the proposed protocol will be demonstrated by the random oracle model. Furthermore, we use the logic analysis method to analyze the proposed protocol. This protocol does not use any overload cryptographic operations and requires less communicational and computational costs than the results obtained previously from the existing scholarship.
INTRODUCTION
Network security has recently become a popular issue worldwide. In an open network environment, identity authentication and confidentiality are the two primary security services. When a legal user wants to login a server to obtain its service, the server has to authenticate the user's identity. Through this user authentication process, the server decides whether the services can be provided for the login user. In addition, the user needs to authenticate the server to ensure that it is indeed the server he wants to login so that a phishing attack is prevented. Because there are more and more phishing attacks in the open network, the user should authenticate the server while he logs in. It is important to authenticate each other when the user and the server want to communicate through the open network. Message confidentiality between the user and the server is another important issue for network security. The symmetric cryptosystem is one of the mechanisms most widely used to provide message confidentiality. However, the user and the server must share a session key before performing a symmetric cryptosystem. An authenticated key agreement (AKE) protocol is a total solution for providing identity authentication and message confidentiality security services. It is an important technique of network security.
In conventional password authentication schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , a remote user is allowed to use one password to login one server. The user needs not only to register each server that he would like to access, but also must memorize the identities and passwords which he uses to login the corresponding server. The user must keep many different identities and passwords secretly by secure considerations. It is neither convenient nor practical to do such a thing. In an effort to solve this problem, a number of password authentication schemes have been proposed for multi-server architectures [12 -14] .
Li et al. proposed a remote password authentication scheme using neural networks for multi-servers [13] . In their scheme, each remote user can use one password to login several servers which they are authorized to access. However, each server needs to store the weights of the classification network, thus spending too much time on training neural networks. Li et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the off-line password guessing attack and privileged insider's attack [15] . Lin et al. also THE COMPUTER JOURNAL Vol. 50 No. 5, 2007 proposed a remote user authentication scheme for multi-server architecture [14] . It is based on the ElGamal digital signature scheme and the simple geometric properties on the Euclidean plane. When considering security, their scheme takes massive costs on computation as well as communication. However, Lin et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack and the password guessing attack [16] . Tsaur et al. proposed two smart-card-based password authentication schemes based on the Lagrange interpolating polynomial for multi-servers [17, 18] in 2004 and 2005 . Both of these schemes take mass computation and communication; the amount of secret data stored in the smart card depends on the number of servers it is authorized to access. In 2004, Juang proposed a multi-server password AKE scheme [12] , which allows each user to use a smart card to login a server and finally establish a common session key with this server. However, Juang's scheme does not provide explicit key authentication and takes much communicational costs. In 2005, Chang and Kuo proposed another multi-server password AKE scheme using smart card [19] . As the scheme is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem and a modulus table, the user should get the data stored in the modulus table first while he tries to login the server. The size of the modulus table depends on the number of servers it is authorized to access. Moreover, their scheme does not provide explicit key authentication and take much communicational costs.
In this paper, we propose an efficient AKE protocol for a multi-server architecture. Each user keeps only one identity, one smart card and one password; with these he can log into many different servers using the proposed protocol. The proposed scheme makes use of smart cards in order to keep some private information secret. Owing to the limited memory space in the smart card, each user's smart card stores only one secret data, although he was authorized to access many different servers with this smart card. The proposed protocol provides mutual authentication to prevent the phishing attack. Moreover, the user and the server will establish a common session key for message confidentiality. They will confirm the session key because of the explicit key authentication property in the proposed protocol. This protocol can resist the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the off-line dictionary attack, the known key attack, the unknown key share attack, the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack. In the proposed protocol, each user can change his password without connecting to any server. Furthermore, the proposed protocol does not use any overload cryptography operations. Therefore, it is more efficient than the results previously obtained by others.
We formally demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol through Kudla and Paterson's approach [20] which is based on the modified Bellare -Rogaway (mBR) model and the mBR game [21 -24] . In addition, we also prove the correctness of the proposed protocol by Buttyán et al.'s logic analysis method [25] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the definitions and theorems used in the proposed protocol. We propose the AKE protocol for multi-servers in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the security properties in the proposed protocol. Next, we make comparisons between the proposed protocol and the previous schemes in Section 5. Finally, we draw our conclusions in the last section.
PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces definitions and theorems which are used in the proposed scheme.
Exclusive OR operation: We use the notation W ¼ X È Y to represent that W is equal to X bitwise Exclusive OR Y. Ghanem and Wahab [26] showed that the Exclusive OR operation is secure and very fast to compute. The Exclusive OR operation provides the following properties.
(1) W, X and Y are represented in the same bit length. THEOREM 2.1. Let x and y be two n bits specific values and w ¼ x È y. The probability to get the specific values x and y from the given w is negligible when n is large.
Proof. According to property (1) of the Exclusive OR operation, W should be a n bits value when X and Y are n bits values. There are 2 n different possible pairs (x 0 , y 0 ) which satisfy w ¼ x 0 È y 0 by property (4) of the Exclusive OR operation. The probability to get the specific (x, y) from the given w is 1/2 n . It is negligible when n is large.
A Finding line function problem: For a specific straight line function L :
0 is a X-coordinate value of a special point of L. We define the computational finding line function problem, decisional finding line function problem and gap finding line function problem in the following manner.
Computational finding line function problem: Given a, construct the straight line function L :
Decisional finding line function problem: Given the straight line function L : Y ¼ aX þ b mod p, a, c, h( . ), where c is a constant and h( . ) is a one-way hash function, let y 0 ¼ h(x 0 È c) and determine whether (x 0 , y 0 ) is a point of the line function L.
Gap finding line function problem: Given a, as well as an oracle that solves the decisional finding line function
The computational finding line function problem is hard when p is a large prime.
Proof. According to property (4) of the Exclusive OR operation, there are 2 n different pairs (a, x 0 ) that satisfy a ¼ a È x 0 for the given a, where n is the bit length of p. In order to construct the specific straight line function L : Y ¼ aX þ b mod p, we have to get the correct a and x 0 . The probability to get the correct a and x 0 is 1/2 n ; it is negligible when p is large. The computational finding line function problem is hard when p is a large prime.
A THEOREM 2.3. The Gap finding line function problem is hard when p is a large prime.
Proof. According to property (4) of the Exclusive OR operation, there are 2 n different pairs (a, x 0 ) that satisfy a ¼ a È x 0 , where n is the bit length of p. That means that there are 2 n different straight line functions from these 2 n different pairs, (a, x 0 ). We send a guessed straight line function, a, h( . ) and c to an oracle that solves the decisional finding line function problem. If the guessed straight line function is equal to the specific straight line L : Y ¼ aX þ b mod p, the oracle's output is Yes; otherwise it outputs No. The probability to get the correct straight line function is 1/2 n21 ; it is negligible when p is large. The Gap finding line function problem is hard when p is a large prime. A
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section proposes the AKE protocol for multi-servers. There are three roles in this protocol: users, servers and trusted management server. The trusted management server manages a group of servers (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n ). The user should register to the trusted management server before logging into a server of this group. During initiation of the proposed protocol, the trusted management server chooses and publishes a one-way hash function h and prime number p. It also selects and keeps a secret value s [ Z p * . The trusted management server shares a secret key k Mj with each server S j , j ¼ 1, 2, . . . , n. Each server has an ID-table to indicate the validity of each user.
The proposed protocol includes three phases: the registration phase, the login phase and the password change phase. If a user wants to login some servers, he must first perform the registration phase. This is typically done through some out-of-band, noncryptographic technique. The user submits his identity, the hash value of his password and all of the servers that he would like to access in the future to the trusted management server via a secure channel. The password is chosen by the user himself. The trusted management server verifies the validity of the user and stores some parameters in a smart card. The smart card also provides a one-way hash function algorithm (such as SHA-256) [27] . Finally, it delivers the smart card to the user and sends the information of the user to those servers. The legal user performs the login phase of the proposed protocol with his password and smart card to login the server, and the user will establish a common session key with that login server. The user and the login server authenticate each other in the login phase. By the password change phase of the proposed protocol, the legal user can change his password without connecting to any server. We illustrate these three phases in detail in the following section.
The registration phase
This phase is performed when a user requests to register to the trusted management server. The connection of user and the trusted management server in this phase is based on some out-of-band noncryptographic technique. We assume that a user U i attempts to login the servers S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m in the future, where fS 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m g is a subset of the servers managed by the trusted management server. The steps of the registration phase are as follows.
Step R1: The user U i sends his identity ID U i , the hash value of his password h(PW i ) and the identities ID S 1 , ID S 2 , . . . , ID S m of S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m to the trusted management server via a secure channel.
Step R2: The trusted management server verifies the validity of the user, then computes
where T is the timestamp;
Step R3: The trusted management server stores the values fID U i , v i g, the one-way hash function h and the prime number p into a smart card and delivers the smart card to the user U i .
Step R4: The user U i sets the personal identification number (PIN) to active the smart card after he receives it from the trusted management server.
Step R5: The trusted management server sends fID U i , V ij g to the server S j , where
. . , mg and E k Mj denotes a symmetric encryption with the encrypted key k Mj .
Step R6: The server S j decrypts the value V ij to get (w
is equal to ID U i , he assures V ij is correct and stores it with the valid period in the user table.
Step R7: The user U i performs the password change phase immediately to change his password.
The login phase
We assume the authorized user U i wants to login the server S j , where S j belongs to the server set fS 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m g which he has chosen in the registration phase. The user inserts his smart card to the card reader of a terminal, keys in the PIN to active the smart card, then inputs his password PW i and the server S j 's identity ID S j . After that, the smart card and the server S j will perform the following steps to verify each other and establish a common session key between them. The steps of this phase are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Step L1: After the user U i keys in the PIN to active the smart card and inputs his password PW i and ID S j (the identity of the server S j ), the smart card performs the following substeps.
Randomly selects a non-zero value a [ Z p and constructs a straight line L ij in GF(p) based on point (w ij , h(w ij È ID U i )) and slope a.
where
Substep L1-5: Sends the message fID U i , M 1 , R 1 g to the server S j . 
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Step L2: Server S j performs the following substeps to authenticate the user and to generate the session key K: Substep L2-1: Uses the shared secret key k Mj to decrypt V ij which is stored in the user table to get (w
is not equal to ID U i , he rejects this login requirement.
0 , a 0 ) is equal to R 1 , the server is assured that the user is U i ; otherwise he rejects this connection. Substep L2-5: Selects a random number r, and computes the following values.
Substep L2-6: Returns the message fID S j , M 2 , M 3 g to the user U i .
Step L3: The user U i performs the following substeps to authenticate the server and generate the session key.
is equal to K 0 , the user U i is assured that the server is S j and K 00 is the session key between the user U i and the server S j ; otherwise he rejects this connection.
Step L4: If h(R 2 , K) is equal to M 4 , the server S j assures that the user U i generated the same session key; otherwise he rejects this connection.
The password change phase
In this section, we assume the user U i would like to change his password. He can perform the following steps to change his password without connecting to any server.
Step C1: The user U i inserts his smart card in the card reader, keys in the PIN to active the smart card, then inputs his old password PW i and new password PW i 0 to the smart card.
Step C2: The smart card uses the hash function h to compute h(PW i ) and h(PW i 0 ), and updates the value v i stored in the smart card as.
Then the user U i must use his new password PW i 0 to login the servers in the future.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Informally, an AKE is secure if each user can get an authenticated session key after performing the protocol and all other users cannot learn any information about the session key [24, 28] . A secure AKE protocol implies that the protocol achieves two security properties: simultaneous mutual authentication and session key establishment. In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed protocol can achieve AKE security [24, 28] under some well-known attacks: the impersonation attack, the dictionary attack, the known key attack, the replay attack, the unknown key share attack, the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack. In section 4.1, we demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol by the random oracle model. We use the logic analysis method to prove the correctness of the proposed protocol in section 4.2. We demonstrate that the proposed protocol resists the replay attack, the unknown key share attack, the stolen verifier attack, and the insider attack in sections 4.3 -4.6.
Random oracle model
Bellare and Rogaway [21, 22] first formalized the notion of security for the key agreement in the random oracle model. Black-Wilson et al. [23] and Bellare et al. [24] made extensions to these models. In 2005, Kudla and Paterson [20] proposed a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for key agreement protocols. This approach is based on the mBR model and the modified Bellare -Rogaway game. This section uses this approach, the mBR model and the mBR game to prove the security of the proposed AKE protocol (denoted as protocol P). We model hash function h as a random oracle in our security analysis. Section 4.1.1 introduces the mBR model, the mBR game, the reduced mBR game and related definitions. We use the previous results to prove the security of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model in section 4.1.2.
The mBR model
This section defines the notations used in the mBR model, some definitions of the mBR game and the related reduced mBR game [20] .
Protocol participants: In the mBR model, we define a set of unique participant identities fUg. The set fUg is the union of two nonempty, finite and disjoint subsets fUserg and fServerg. There are two roles, the user and the server, in the login phase of our protocol P. When the user U i ([fUserg) wants to login the server S j ([fServerg), the user and the server authenticate each other and establish a common session key. The notation P A m denotes the oracle, which models the mth instance of par- The mBR game: The mBR game between a challenger C and an adversary E is used to model the security of the protocol P. We describe the behavior of C and E in the mBR game in the following.
C runs a set-up algorithm on a security parameter k to create the public parameters, a set of participants fUg (fUg [ (fUserg < fServerg)) and related oracles P U m to model instances of each participant U. C also distributes secret values to each participant and randomly selects a bit b. E may access all the participants' oracles and any random oracles (e.g. hash function h) in the mBR game. The queries that E can make are described in the following. † Send (U, m, M): This query models that when the adversary E sends a message M to the oracle P U m , the oracle computes what the protocol P says and sends back the response. The adversary E can send a special query Send (U, m, l) to a user oracle P A m to initiate an execution of protocol P, where
The adversary E sends this query to the oracle P U m . If P U m has accepted and is holding the session key, it then returns the session key to the adversary. This query models the known key attack, it means that if the session key was compromised, it can find out the session key in other sessions. † Corrupt (U): If the adversary E sends this query to a oracle U, it returns its long-term private key. This query models the forward secrecy, which means if an adversary gets the long-lived key of a participant, he cannot snatch any previous session keys.
We also show definitions of the oracle states, partners, freshness and test query in the mBR game [20] . Each definition is illustrated in the following:
Oracle states: In the mBR game, an oracle has one of the following states.
(1) Accepted: If an oracle decides to accept and holds a session key after it received some messages, the oracle's state is accepted. Partners: When running a protocol P, the oracle may hold a partner identity (pid), a session identity (sid) and a session key (sk). The partner identity shows who has exchanged messages and established a session key in the protocol P. The session identity is the session identifier in the protocol P. 
In the mBR game, we use advantage E (p) to denote the adversary E's advantage, that is, the probability that E outputs a bit b 0 such that b ¼ b 0 . Before we define the security of protocol P, the definition of benign adversary is given as in [20] . A benign adversary is an adversary who relays messages between parties without modification. In the definition below, we illustrate the secure AKE protocol in the presence of the benign adversary. (1) In the presence of the benign adversary, two oracles executing the protocol, both oracles are accepted and holding the same session identity and session key. The session key is uniformly distributed in GF(p). (2) For any adversary E, the advantage advantage E (p) in the mBR game is negligible.
Based on the mBR game, we introduce the reduced mBR game in [20] .
The reduced mBR game: The reduced mBR game is identical to the mBR game except that the adversary E is not allowed to send any reveal and test queries. Instead to win the game, the adversary E must select a fresh and accepted oracle as the test oracle and output the session key of this test oracle at the end of this game. Because the adversary E in this game must compute the session key of the test oracle, this game also called the computational NR-mBR (cNR-mBR) game. In the cNR-mBR game, we use Advantage E (p) to denote the adversary E's advantage, that is, the probability that E outputs a session key sk such that sk ¼ sk P U m, where sk P U m is the session key held by the test oracle P U m selected by E.
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A protocol is a cNR-mBR-secure key agreement protocol if the following holds true.
(1) In the presence of the benign adversary, two oracles executing the protocol, both of the oracles are accepted and holding the same session identity and session key. The session key is uniformly distributed in GF(p)
In order to use the mBR game to prove the security of the proposed protocol P, we illustrate the related protocol P 0 and provide definitions of strong partnering and the session string decisional problem based on [20] .
Strong partnering: Assume an adversary E would like to attack a key agreement protocol P in an mBR game. If he has a non-negligible probability to make any two oracles P A m and P B n accepted and holding the same session key and these two oracles are not partner, then the protocol P has weak partnering. If protocol P does not have weak partnering, then the protocol P has strong partnering.
Related protocol P
0 : We define a related protocol P 0 in order to help us prove the security of the original proposed protocol P. The related protocol P 0 is similar to the protocol P, with exception of the method to compute the session key between the user and the server. If the session key in protocol P is the hash value of the session string, then the session key in protocol P 0 is the session string itself. Therefore, the user and the server do not use the hash function to compute the session key in protocol P 0 . This means that in protocol P 0 , the server S j computes the session key in Substep L2-5 as K ¼ (r, a 0 , b 0 , ID U i , ID S j ), and the user U i computes the session key in Substep L3-4 as
Session string decisional problem for protocol P: Given the transcript T U m of an oracle P U m in the mBR game and a string s, decide whether the string s is the session string of oracle P U m .
Security proof of the proposed protocol
This section demonstrates the security of the proposed protocol in the random oracle model based on the model and games described in section 4.1.1. Theorem 4.1 shows that the proposed protocol P has strong partnering. Theorem 4.2 proves that the cNR-mBR security of protocol P 0 (the related protocol of the proposed protocol P) is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the computational finding line function problem. Finally, Theorem 4.5 demonstrates the proposed protocol is secure based on Theorems 2.3 and 4.4. THEOREM 4.1. Protocol P has strong partnering in the random oracle model.
Proof. In Substeps L2-5 and L3-4 of the proposed protocol P, the partnering information is included in the session string. Thus, the protocol P has strong partnering in the random oracle model [20] . A THEOREM 4.2. The cNR-mBR security of protocol P 0 is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the computational finding line function problem in GF(p).
Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary E who can win the cNR-mBR game in the protocol P 0 with advantage h which is non-negligible in security parameter k and in polynomial time t. Suppose that the number of users is N U , the number of servers is N S and the number of sessions each participant may be involved in is N T , where N U , N S and N T are polynomial functions of k.
We construct an algorithm F to solve the computational finding line function problem in GF(p) with non-negligible probability based on the adversary E. F sets the input value a in the computational finding line function problem as the response of oracle P A m in Step L1, which means that M 1 ¼ a. F would like to reconstruct and output the line function L : Y ¼ aX þ b mod p. In other words, F's task is to solve the computational finding line function problem.
F simulates a challenger in a cNR-mBR game of protocol P 0 with adversary E. F sets up the game with a large prime p, generates a set of users of size N U and a set of servers of size N S . For each user U i , F sets U i 's private values: h(PW i ) and v i . For each server S j , F sets S j 's private value: d S j . F selects a session number n [ f 1, . . . , N T g. F starts E and answers the following queries sent from E: Send: Adversary E may send a special Send query to user oracle P U i s which sets pid U i ¼ S j and instructs U i to initiate a protocol run with S j as its partner. E can also send a Send query with message M to any oracle P U s and the oracle outputs the response according to the protocol P 0 . If E sends an initiate Send query to user oracle P A m , it outputs a.
Corrupt(U):
If adversary E sends a Corrupt query to the user A, then F aborts. If E sends a Corrupt query to other participants, then F gives its private value to E.
If F wants to use E to find out the output value of the computational finding line function problem, then E must set oracle P A m as the Test oracle. The probability that E sets oracle P A m as the Test oracle is 1/(N U Â N T ). E outputs a session key: (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , ID A , ID B ), where k 1 , k 2 , k 3 [ Z p . Then F determines whether E sent an initiate Send query to oracle P U i s . If P U i s was an initiator, then F outputs k 2 , k 3 as its guess for the values a, b of the straight line function L : Y ¼ aX þ b mod p; otherwise F outputs k 1 , k 2 as its guess. Now we can see that if the probability that E wins the cNR-mBR game of protocol P 0 in time t is h, then the probability that F solves the computational finding line function problem in GF(p) in time t is h 0 ¼ h Â (1/N U Â N T ) which is non-negligible in k.
A 608 R.-J. HWANG AND S.-H. SHIAU THEOREM 4.3. Suppose that protocol P uses a hash function h (assume that h is a random oracle) to produce a hashed session key and protocol P has strong partnering. If the cNR-mBR security of the related protocol P 0 is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the computational finding line function problem, and the session string decisional problem for protocol P is polynomial time reducible to the decisional finding line function problem, then the mBR security of protocol P is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the Gap finding line function problem.
Proof. As the results in [20] .
A THEOREM 4.4. Protocol P is secure in the random oracle model, assuming the hardness of the Gap finding line function problem.
Proof. In protocol P, the user and server use a hash function to computes a hashed session key. Protocol P has strong partnering in the random oracle model by Theorem 4.1.
By Theorem 4.2, the cNR-mBR security of the related protocol P 0 is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the computational finding line function problem.
In protocol P, we assumed that user A wants to login server B. They establish a session key in this connection. The transcript between them is f( session string is (r, a, b, ID A , ID B ) . A decisional finding line function oracle can be used to solve the session string decisional problem for protocol P. Therefore, the session string decisional problem for protocol P is polynomial time reducible to the decisional finding line function problem.
According to the previous results and Theorem 4.3, we know that the mBR security of protocol P is probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the hardness of the Gap finding line function problem. If the Gap finding line function problem is hard, then the protocol P is mBR secure in the random oracle model. A THEOREM 4.5. The proposed protocol P is secure in the random oracle model when p is a large prime.
Proof. By Theorem 2.3, the Gap finding line function problem is hard when p is a large prime. By Theorem 4.4, protocol P is secure in the random oracle model assuming the hardness of the Gap finding line function problem. According to Theorems 2.3 and 4.4, the proposed protocol P is secure in the random oracle model. A
Logic proof
There are some logic analysis methods proposed to prove the correctness of an authentication protocol [25, 29, 30] The synthetic rules, which are used to prove the proposed protocol, are described in the following. † Synthetic rule 1: In order to recognize a message X which arrived via a channel C, a principal P has to see C(X) and can read C.
Pj ; ðP / XjCÞ a P / CðXÞ a P [ rðCÞ † Synthetic rule 2: In order to believe a formula f, a principal P has to believe a formula f 0 and the implication f 0 ! f.
Pj ; f a Pj ; f 0 a Pj ; ðf 0 ! fÞ
Proof of the login phase
We assume that user U i wants to login the server S j . The messages transmitted between them are as follows.
The messages transfer to the description in the following manner.
(
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S j can read channel C w ij . Assumption 3: U i j ; ðwðC w ij Þ ¼ fU i ; S j gÞ U i believes that only U i and S j can write channel C w ij . Assumption 4: S j j ; ðwðC w ij Þ ¼ fU i ; S j gÞ S j believes that only U i and S j can write channel C w ij .
S j can read channel C R 2 . Assumption 7: U i j ; ðwðC R 2 Þ ¼ fU i ; S j gÞ U i believes that only U i and S j can write channel C R 2 . Assumption 8: S j j ; ðwðC R 2 Þ ¼ fU i ; S j gÞ S j believes that only U i and S j can write channel C R 2 . Assumption 9: U i j ; ððU i / rjC R 2 Þ ! U i ! K S j Þ U i believes that U i sees r via channel C R 2 , which implies that U i and S j share K. Assumption 10: S j j ; ððS j / ajC w ij Þ ! U i ! K S j Þ S j believes that S j sees a via channel C w ij , which implies that U i and S j share K. Assumption 11: U i j ; ððU i / KjC R 2 Þ ! ðS j j ; U i ! K S j ÞÞ U i believes that U i sees K via channel C R 2 , which implies that S j believes that U i and S j share K. Assumption 12: S j j ; ððS j / KjC R 2 Þ ! ðU i j ; U i ! K S j ÞÞ S j believes that S j sees K via channel C R 2 , which implies that U i believes that U i and S j share K.
In order to prove the authentication property of the proposed protocol, there are four goals need to be achieved. They are as follows.
We proof these goals using the synthetic rules and assumptions discussed above.
(1) Prove Goal 1:
Proof. We start from the goal U i j ; U i ! K S j . By Synthetic rule 2, we know that
The second new goal (2) is reached by Assumption 9. We continue with the first new goal (1). Using Synthetic rule 1:
The first new goal (3) is message 2 of the protocol. The second new goal (4) is reached by Assumption 5. We achieve Goal 1:
Proof. We start from the goal S j j ; U i ! S j . By Synthetic rule 2, we know that
The second new goal (6) is reached by Assumption 10. We continue with the first new goal (5). Using Synthetic rule 1:
The first new goal (7) is message 1 of the protocol. The second new goal (8) is reached by Assumption 2. We achieve Goal 2:
Proof. We start from the goal U i j ; ðS j j ; U i ! K S j Þ. By Synthetic rule 2, we know that
The second new goal (10) is reached by Assumption 11. We continue with the first new goal (9) . Using Synthetic rule 1:
The first new goal (11) We achieve Goal 3:
Proof. We start from the goal S j j ; ðU i j ; U i ! K S j Þ. By Synthetic rule 2, we know that
The second new goal (14) is reached by assumption 12. We continue with the first new goal (13) . Using Synthetic rule 1:
The first new goal (15) is message 3 of the protocol. The second new goal (16) is reached by Assumption 6. We achieve Goal 4: S j j ; ðU i j ; U i ! S j Þ from above.
A By the above discussions, we show that the proposed protocol provides the mutual authentication and explicit key authentication properties.
Replay attack
If the adversary can impersonate a legal user to login the specified server by replaying the transmitted messages between the legal user and the server, we say that this protocol cannot prevent the replay attack [31] .
Assume that an adversary collects the messages fID U i , M 1 , R 1 g and fM 4 g of the proposed protocol when the user U i logs into the server S j . The adversary impersonates the user U i to login the server S j by replying the message fID U i , M 1 , R 1 g in Step L1. However, S j chooses a random number r 0 to generate and return fM 2 0 , M 3 0 g to the adversary in Step L2. The adversary cannot generate the correct M 4 0 corresponding to r 0 and returns it to the server S j in Step L3 because he does not know the correct straight line L ij . He only can reply with the old fM 4 g in Step L3. In this case, the server S j will detect that he is an illegal user in Step L4, except for when the server S j chooses the same random number r's in this two login phases. The probability that S j chooses the same random numbers in two different login requirements is 1/p. It is quite small if p is large. We can say it is hard for the adversary to masquerade the legal user to login the server by replaying the old message.
Unknown key share attack
The unknown key share attack defined in IEEE 1363-2000 standard [32] shows as follows. † If a user is authorized to login the two different servers S 1 nd S 2 with the same password, then an adversary can forge the server that he is accessing S 1 , but he is actually accessing S 2 . For example, while the user is sending a request to login S 1 , an adversary may intercept and forward the login messages to S 2 . By this attack, the user believes that he accessed S 1 , but actually accessed S 2 . † If two different users U 1 and U 2 are authorized to use the same password to login the server, the server may not identify the login user. For example, as user U 1 is sending a request to login the server, the adversary modifies the identity information U 1 of the request message to U 2 . By this attack, the server believed that it was U 2 who accessed the server, but it was actually U 1 .
We demonstrate that the proposed protocol can resist the two cases of the unknown key share attack in the following paragraphs.
Case 1. By the proposed protocol, assume that as user U i would like to login the server S j , he constructs a line L ij : Y ¼ f(X) ¼ aX þ b mod p and sends the messages fID U i , M 1 , R 1 g to S j , where
If an adversary forwards the message to another server S m , S m will decrypt V im to get the value w 0 im and reconstruct the line L
Since w 0 im is not equal to w ij , the line L ij is not equal to line L 0 im . The server S m will reject this login request in Step L2-4. It is clear that the proposed protocol can resist the first case of the unknown key share attack.
Case 2. By the proposed protocol, assume that users U i and U n select the same password, i.e. PW i ¼ PW n . As user U i would like to login the server S j , he constructs a line L ij : Y ¼ f(X) ¼ aX þ b mod p and sends the message fID U i , M 1 , R 1 g to the server S j , where 
It is clear that the line L ij is not equal to line L 0 nj because w ij is not equal to w 0 nj . The server S j will reject the login request in
Step L2-4. The proposed protocol can fight against the second case of the unknown key shared attack.
Stolen verifier attack
If the adversary can use the verifier which he stole from server's user table to impersonate a legal user to login the server, or can impersonate the server to cheat the legal user, we say that this protocol cannot be used against the stolen verifier attack [33] . Assume an adversary gets a verifier V ij of the user U i from the server S j 's user table. However, as the adversary does not know the shared secret key k Mj , he cannot get the correct w ij by decrypting V ij . He cannot impersonate user U i or server S j to perform the login phase of the proposed protocol successfully.
Insider attack
If an insider of the servers can obtain the password PW i of user U i to impersonate the user U i to access other servers, then this protocol cannot against the insider attack [34] . In the proposed protocol, an insider of the server S j cannot obtain the password PW i of the user U i since the login request message sent in Step L1-5 and the verifier V ij stored in the server S j do not contain the password PW i . Furthermore, if an insider of server S j uses the verifier V ij of user U i to impersonate user U i to access other server S m , since the insider only gets w ij , he still does not know the secret value w im to construct the correct login request message in Step L1. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the insider attack.
COMPARISON
This section makes a comparison among the proposed protocol, Tsaur et al.'s schemes [17, 18] (denoted as TWL2004 and TWL2005), Juang's scheme [12] (denoted as Juang2004) and Chang and Kuo's scheme [19] (denoted as CK2005). The comparison is divided into three parts: security properties, computational costs and communicational costs.
Security properties
We discuss the security properties provided by Tsaur et al.'s schemes [17, 18] , Juang's scheme [12] , Chang and Kuo's scheme [19] and the proposed protocol in this section. These security properties include mutual authentication, explicit key authentication, resist replay attack, resist unknown key share attack, resist stolen verifier attack and resist insider attack. The results of these security properties comparisons are shown in Table 1 . Both Juang's scheme and Chang and Kuo's scheme provide mutual authentication but they do not provide explicit key authentication. Both Tsaur et al.'s schemes do not provide mutual authentication and do not establish a common session key. When the user accesses a server, he will be authenticated by the server. However, the user can hardly make sure if he has accessed a counterfeit server. The phishing attack may thus occur on the network. Besides, without a common session key to perform the symmetric encryption, they cannot protect the exchange data that they keep in confidentiality, or they must perform another key agreement protocol to do so.
The proposed protocol provides mutual authentication for the user and the server, who establish a common session key. It also provides explicit key authentication. If a legal user would like to change his password, he can do it without connecting to any server; even the trusted management server does not need to be accessed. All schemes resist the replay attack, the unknown key shared attack, the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack.
Communicational costs
We present a comparison with respect to communicational costs among Tsaur et al.'s schemes [17, 18 ], Juang's scheme [12] , Chang and Kuo's scheme [19] and the proposed protocol in this section. The results are shown in the last two rows of Table 2 . The security of Tsaur et al.'s scheme [17] proposed in 2004 is based on the factoring problem, which means that the parameter N of their scheme should be 1024 bits in consideration of security. The security of another Tsaur et al.'s scheme [18] proposed in 2005 is based on the discrete logarithm problem. Parameter P of their scheme should be 512 bits in consideration of security. Juang's scheme [12] , Chang and Kuo's scheme [19] and the proposed protocol use a one-way hash function and symmetric cryptosystem. We assume that we use SHA-256 [35] as the one-way hash function and AES [36] as the symmetric cryptosystem. Both the output size of SHA-256 and the size of random number are 256 bits, while the block size of AES is 128 bits. We also ignore the message size of the identity in all schemes. Juang's scheme, Chang and Kuo's scheme and our proposed protocol take three rounds to transmit messages, while both Tsaur et al.'s schemes take only one round to do it. Our protocol takes two more rounds than Tsaur et al.'s schemes, but our protocol provides both the properties of mutual authentication and implicit key authentication. These two properties are very important for network security.
The size of the messages sent between the user and the server in Tsaur et al.'s scheme [17] proposed in 2004 is 1 Timestamp and (m þ 3) Â 1024 bits, where m denotes the number of servers. The size of the messages sent between the user and the server in Tsaur et al.'s the other scheme [18] proposed in 2005 is 1 Timestamp and (m þ 3) Â 512 bits. In Juang's scheme, the size of the messages sent from the user to the server is 256 þ 6 Â 128 bits (including one nonce and six symmetric encryption blocks), while the size of the messages sent from the server to the user is 6 Â 128 bits (including six symmetric encryption blocks). In Chang and Kuo's scheme, the size of the messages sent from the user to the server is 8 Â 128 bits (including eight symmetric encryption blocks), while the size of the messages sent from the server to the user is 6 Â 128 bits (including six symmetric encryption blocks). In the proposed protocol, the size of the messages sent from the user to the server is 3 Â 256 bits (including one 256 bits value and two hash values), while the size of the messages sent from the server to the user is 2 Â 256 bits (including two 256 bits values). It is obvious that the communicational costs of our protocol is much lower than that of Tsaur et al.'s schemes, Juang's scheme and Chang and Kuo's scheme. Therefore, our proposed protocol is more efficient than their schemes.
Computational costs
We discuss both Tsaur et al.'s schemes [17, 18 ], Juang's scheme [12] , Chang and Kuo's scheme [19] , and the proposed protocol in terms of computational costs in this section. The results are shown in the first four rows of Table 2 . The computational costs of Exclusive-OR operation, the hash function and modular addition are lower than that of symmetric encryption/decryption and modular multiplication. We do not take into consideration the computational costs of the Exclusive-OR operation, the hash function and modular addition. Since the computational cost of symmetric encryption/decryption is based on the number of blocks, we use the number of blocks to show the result of our comparison SE, denote the symmetric encryption (blocks); SD, denote the symmetric decryption (blocks); ME, denote the modular exponentiation operation; MM, denote the modular multiplication operation; Ro, denote the number of rounds; SM, denote the size of sent message (bits); T, denote the bit length of timestamp in this section. In Tsaur et al.'s scheme [17] proposed in 2004, the user performs four modular exponentiations and mbm/2c þ b3m/2c þ 3 modular multiplications, while the server needs three modular exponentiations and 2m 2 þ 3m þ 4 modular multiplications, where m denotes the number of servers. In another of Tsaur et al.'s scheme [18] proposed in 2005, the user performs three modular exponentiations and mbm/2c þ b3m/2c þ 2 modular multiplications, while the server needs three modular exponentiations and 2m 2 þ 3m þ 4 modular multiplications. The user in Juang's scheme performs 12 blocks of symmetric encryption/decryption operations; meanwhile, the server performs 14 blocks of symmetric encryption/ decryption operations. In Chang and Kuo's scheme, the user performs 14 blocks of symmetric encryption/decryption operations, while the server performs 16 blocks of symmetric encryption/decryption operations. The user in the proposed protocol performs one modular multiplication operation; meanwhile, the server performs two blocks of symmetric decryption operations and one modular multiplication operation. The computational costs of modu-lar exponentiation are higher than that of modular multiplication [37, 38] . As the comparison above shows, the proposed protocol is more efficient than any other scheme.
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an efficient AKE protocol for multiservers. The legal user can access multi-servers securely by keeping only one weak password and a smart card. We propose to make use of smart cards in order to keep some private information secret. With its limited memory, the smart card of the proposed protocol stores only one secret value, although it is authorized to access many different servers. The proposed protocol not only provides mutual authentication between the user and the server to prevent the phishing attack, but also establishes a common session key to provide message confidentiality. In addition, the proposed protocol provides the explicit key authentication property for established common session keys. The proposed protocol is provably secure to withstand the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the off-line dictionary attack, the known key attack, the unknown key share attack, the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack. We demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol using the random oracle model. Furthermore, we use the logic analysis method to analyze the proposed protocol. In the password change phase of the proposed protocol, each user can change his password without connecting to any server. Finally, without using any overload cryptography operation, the proposed protocol is more efficient and practical than the schemes previously discussed in this paper.
